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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether it was reasonable and necessary

that the trial court

deny plaintiff any right, title and interest in and to one-half of plaintiff's
retirement.
2.

Whether the trial court was correct

right, title and interest in and to defendant's

in denying plaintiff any

retirement when the Decree of

Divorce was silent as to defendant's retirement.
3.

Whether plaintiff's

right

in and to one-half of defendant's

retirement was barred by res judicata.
4.

Whether the plaintiff established

a

substantial change of

circumstances which have occurred since the Decree of Divorce.
5.

Whether the trial court's memorandum

decision adequately

supports the award of alimony to the plaintiff and after considering those
factors, whether the court abused its discretion in awarding alimony to the
plaintiff.
6.

Whether the trial court correctly

followed

the purpose of

alimony when alimony was awarded to the plaintiff and whether it was a clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion to award alimony to the plaintiff.

DETERMINATIVE ROLE: Otah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5
The rule relevant to this appeal is as follows:
"The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the distribution of property as is reasonable and necessary."
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IN THE COOKF OF APPEALS, STATE OF OTAH

GAIL KATHLEEN THEOCKMORTQN,
Plaintiff /Respondent,
Case No.: 870400-CA
Category: 14b

vs.
CECIL DEE THROCKMORTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

CROSS-APPEAL AND REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, Gail Kathleen Throckmorton, commenced an action seeking
modification of a Decree of Divorce dated September

13, 1976.

The plaintiff

sought to have the alimony adjusted from the sum of $1.00 per year to the sum
of $500.00 per month.

The plaintiff further sought one-half of defendant's

retirement, an asset of the marital estate which was not distributed pursuant
to the Decree of Divorce dated September 13, 1976Third

Judicial District Court on

Honorable Homer F.

the

The matter was heard in the

16th day of July 1987, before the

Wilkinson. . The court modified

specifically awarding the plaintiff

the Decree of Divorce

the sum of $396.00 per month. The court

denied any type of award to the plaintiff of defendant's retirement account.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married on or about May 27, 1955. (Tr.
at 5).

During the twenty-one year marriage, plaintiff and defendant had eight

(3) children, all of which have reached majority.
1976,

(Tr. at 6).

In August of

a divorce complaint was filed and approximately one month later on

September 13, 1976, the divorce was granted.

(Tr. at 5).

The divorce filed in

1976 was precipitated by

the defendant who wanted

the divorce.

(Tr. at 5).

The plaintiff went to defendant's attorney whom defendant paid and pursuant to
the Decree of Divorce, plaintiff was awarded the care, custody and control of
the eight (8) children of the marriage.

(Tr. at 5).

The plaintiff was further

awarded, pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, the sum of $1.00 per year as
alimony.

(Tr. at

6).

The Decree of Divorce was silent as to defendant's

retirement with the Utah

State Retirement Fund.

The defendant had commenced

working as a police office on November 17, 1958, and at the time the Decree of
Divorce was granted, had approximately eighteen (18) years of service.
5).

The defendant

(Tr. at

retired on August 31, 1984 with approximately twenty six

(26) years of service.

(Tr. at 5).

The defendant presently receives the sum

of $1,580.00 per month and based on the actuary tables;, defendant will receive
in excess of $500,000.00
actuary tables. (Tr. at 6).

if defendant should live to the age set forth on the
The plaintiff at the present time

and has medical problems which

is unemployed,

include reactive absolute hyperglycemia,

euthyroid, hyprometabolism, chronic angina secondary to coronary insufficiency,
and fiberocystic

disease of the breast.

(Tr. at 6).

Plaintiff's doctor has

recommended open heart sungery but due to plaintiff's
plaintiff has been unable to afford the operation.

financial condition,

(Tr. at 6).

The plaintiff

in 1985 made the sum of $500.00 which was used to help a son on a mission and
support the other children which remained in the home.

(Tr. at 6).

SOMMftRY OF ARGUMENTS
The order of the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson which modified the
Decree of Divorce should be reversed as to denying plaintiff an interest in and
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to defendant's

retirement and upheld as to the alimony increase awarded to the

plaintiff on the following basis.
1.

The trial court having continuing

subsequent changes

jurisdiction

to make

to the Decree of Divorce as to the distribution of property

should have granted to plaintiff one-half of defendant's

retirement because it

was reasonable and necessary.
2-

The Decree of Divorce should have been modified by the trial

court granting to plaintiff one-half of defendant's retirement when the Decree
of Divorce was silent as to defendant's retirement.
3.

The plaintiff's

right to one-half of defendant's retirement

should not have been barred by the Doctrine of Res Judicata when the issue of
defendant's

retirement had never been tried or determined in any previous

adjudication.
4. The plaintiff established

that there has been a substantial

change in circumstances since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The change
in circumstances were as follows:

(a)

including the need for open heart

plaintiff has serious health problems

sungery; (b)

unemployed and due to her medical condition and
children of

the plaintiff is presently
is unable

to work;

(c) the

the parties have all reached majority and defendant is no longer

paying child support.
5. The trial court's memorandum
award of alimony to the plaintiff.

decision adequately

supports the

The award of alimony was based on the

plaintiff being unemployed, being unable to obtain gainful employment because
of medical problems, and

the defendant having retirement income of $18,970.00

per year or $1,584.00 per month.
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6.

The trial court's award of alimony

equitable and justified because it provided

a means by

to the plaintiff was
which plaintiff can

support herself and not become a ward of the state.

ARGUMENT

EQIHLI
THE TRIAL CODET HAVING CONTINUING
JURISDICTION TO MAKE SUBSEQUENT
CHANGES OR NEW ORDERS AS TO DISTRIBUTION
OF PROPERTY SHOULD HAVE GRANTED TO
PLAINTIFF ONE-HALF OF DEFENDANT'S
RETIEEMHff, THE SUBSEQUENT CHANGE
BEING REASONABLE AND NECESSARY
Pursuant to U.CA. Section 30-3-5 it states,
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent
changes
or
new
orders
for
the.. .distribution of property as is reasonable and
necessary.
Applying the above statute to this case, it is clear the lower court
had

continuing

jurisdiction

to make new orders or changes as to the

distribution of property as is reasonable and necessary.

The Supreme Court of

the State of Utah, in regard to the above statute, has stated,
"... Section 30-3-5 does authorize the divorce court
to reallocate property rights between the parties
to the divorce such as by modifying the earlier
Decree." Sudouist v. Sudauist. 639 P.2d 181 (Utah
1982).
In Suctauist the Dtah

Supreme Court

found

that

in a

divorce

proceeding, the District Court had continuing

jurisdiction to make subsequent

changes with

of the parties interest in "then

respect

to the distribution

owned" property. The plaintiff and defendant in the present case at

the time

of the divorce, jointly owned an interest in defendant's retirement. The
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plaintiff, was unaware that she was entitled
retirement

to one-half of defendant's

account at the time of the divorce or at

modification of

the Decree of Divorce

in 1980.

the time of the

It was only after defendant

retired and commenced receiving retirement that plaintiff became aware that she
was entitled

to one-half of defendant's retirement. The plaintiff should have

been entitled to one-half of defendant's retirement as of the date of divorce
in 1978 because the retirement had been accumulated during the marriage and was
an asset of the marital estate. The District Court therefore having continuing
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders, should have found it
fair and reasonable that plaintiff be entitled

to one-half of defendant's

retirement as of the date of the divorce and the Decree should have been
modified accordingly.

POINT II
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE SHODLD HAVE BEEN
MODIFIED GRANTING TO PLAINTIFF ONE-HALF
OF DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT BECAUSE THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS SILEOT AS TO THE
RETIREMENT OF DEFENDANT
The Supreme Court has allowed for the modification of a divorce when
the decree

is silent in regard to an issue when the issue was not contemplated

by the parties or the court at the time of the decree.
Thompson.

709 P. 2d

360

(Utah,

1985).

See e.g. Thompson v.

In Thompson

the wife sought

a

modification of the Decree of Divorce where the decree was totally silent as to
a loan.

The Otah Supreme Court found

matter was not contemplated

by

that where a decree is silent, and a

the parties, and a

substantial change of

circumstances has occurred, a party to a divorce may petition the court by way
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of a modification to have the matter considered and resolved by the court.
In the present case, the Decree of Divorce was totally silent as to
the

retirement of defendant

contemplated

by

and

it was clearly not an

the parties or by the court.

substantial change of circumstances

issue that was

There has further been a

in that plaintiff has become medically

unable to work and plaintiff only became aware of her

right to defendant's

retirement after working in the court system and being advised by a
she had
being

the right to seek a portion of defendant's

silent as to defendant's

contemplated by

retirement and

judge that

retirement. The decree

the retirement not being

the parties, and the substantial change of circumstance which

have occurred should have required the court to grant to plaintiff one-half of
defendant's retirement.

EQIHLJII
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO ONE-HALF OF
DEFENDANTS RETIREMENT SHOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE
OF RES JDDIGATA
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated the following,
When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res
judicata as to those issues which were either tried
and determined, or upon all issues which the party
had a fair opportunity
to present
and have
determined in the other proceeding. Jacobsen v.
J a c o b s , 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985).
As the above case states, an

issue becomes

res judicata when an

issue is tried and determined or the parties had a fair opportunity to present
the issue and have the issue determined.

Applying this to the present case,

plaintiff at no time had an opportunity to present the issue of defendant's
retirement. Plaintiff's lack of knowledge or information as to her right to

-6-

one-half of defendant's retirement kept plaintiff frcan raising the issue at the
time of the divorce and modification hearing. Plaintiff's right to one-half of
defendant's

retirement

should not have been barred by the doctrine of res

judicata when plaintiff did not have a previews opportunity

to have the

retirement issue determined.

voim vr
THE TRIAL COURT OOERBCTLY MODIFIED
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AWARDING
ALIMONY TO THE DEFENDANT IN THAT A
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
HAVE OCCURRED SINCE THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
The Utah

Supreme Court has stated

the following as to the

modification of a Decree of Divorce,
A party who requests a modification of a divorce
decree must initially show that a substantial
change in the circumstances of at least one of the
parties has occurred.
E.g.. Lord v. Shaw. Utah,
882 P.2d 853 (1984); Haslam v. Haslam. Utah, 657
P„2d 757 (1982); Christensen v~ Christensen, supra.
A relative change in the income and expenses of the
parties, if comparatively significant, can amount
to a substantial change in circumstances. Jeppson
v. Jeppsonr 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984).
Applying the

above Utah

cases, plaintiff has established

a

substantial change of circumstance since the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
The substantial changes which have occurred
frcan serious medical problems

including

are that plaintiff is suffering

reactive absolute hyperglycemia,

euthyroid, hyprometabolism, chronic angina secondary to coronary insufficiency,
and fiberocystic disease of the breast, with the recommendation of her doctor
for open heart

surgery.

Due to plaintiff's medical problems, plaintiff is

presently unemployed and unable to work. The fact that plaintiff was
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unemployed at the time of divorce and is presently unemployed should not be the
determining factor as to a change of circumstances. The

fact which

should be

considered is that at the time of the divorce plaintiff was capable of working
and at the present time plaintiff

is incapable of working.

Further, at the

time of the divorce, defendant was paying child support to the plaintiff and at
the present time all eight children have reached majority and plaintiff is no
longer receiving

any

type of

changes which have occurred
changes.

support

from the defendant. The substantial

since the divorce all appear to be permanent

The condition of plaintiff's health is not likely to improve, and

therefore, plaintiff will not be capable of working.
reached majority

terminating completely

All eight children have

any type of support from defendant to

plaintiff with the exception of the alimony awarded
District

Court.

The

to plaintiff by the

plaintiff having been married

approximately twenty one years and

to defendant

the change of circumstances

for

which have

occurred since the Decree of Divorce are a sufficient basis by which to uphold
the trial court's award of alimony to the plaintiff.

POINTY
THE MEMORANDUM OF THE TRIAL COURT
ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS THE AWARD OF
ALIMONY TO THE FLAIOTIFF
The Utah Supreme Court in regard to spousal support has stated,
In deciding whether or not to award spousal support
and, if so, in what amount, the trial court must
consider the financial condition and needs of the
spouse claiming support, the ability of that spouse
to provide sufficient income for him or herself,
and the ability of the responding spouse to provide
the support. Failure to consider these factors
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Faff el v.
Eaffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986).
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Applying the above case to the court's memorandum decision, it is
clear that the court took into consideration all items set forth in Faff el.
In paragraph 7 of its memorandum

decision the court specifically

dealt with the financial conditions and needs of
ability of the plaintiff to provide
District Court

found

sufficient

the plaintiff and with the
income for herself.

the plaintiff to be unemployed

employment due to her physical condition.

The

and unable to gain

In paragraph 8 of its memorandum

decision the District Court found defendant had the ability to provide support
when it determined that defendant had yearly income of $18,970.00 per year and
$1,584.00 per month. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
alimony to the plaintiff when the court took
needs, plaintiff's ability

to

into consideration plaintiff's

support herself, and defendant's ability to

provide the support to plaintiff.

POINT YI
THE TRIAL COURTS AWARD OF ALIMONY
TO THE PLAINTIFF WAS EQUITABLE AND
JUSTIFIED CONSIDERING PLAINTIFF'S
PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION
The Utah Appellate Court has stated the following as to the purpose
of alimony.
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the receiving
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and
to prevent the spouse from becoming a public
chaise".
Eames v. E$m$, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah
App. 1987)(citing Paffel v. Pa£fel, 732 P.2d 96, 100
(Utah 1986). This Court will not interfere with an
award of alimony absent a showing of a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion.
IdTallev v.
TalleyT 739 P. 2d 836 (Utah App. 1987).
As the above case states one of the purposes of alimony is that it
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is a means by which to prevent a spouse from becoming a public charge.

In the

present case it is clear that the plaintiff will become a public chaise unless
defendant is required to provide support to the plaintiff.
As previously

discussed

plaintiff

in

1985, earned approximately

$500.00 and due to plaintiff's medical condition, plaintiff
unable to work.

is unemployed and

If the trial court would have awarded no alimony to the

plaintiff when the plaintiff's circumstances are as outlined,
clearly been a prejudicial

abuse of discretion. The court's award of alimony

to the plaintiff should be upheld in that the purpose
by

it would have

the District Court and

of alimony was followed

the support awarded provides a means by which

plaintiff can support herself rather than become a public charge.

coMausiow
The order of the District Court should be
plaintiff an
Divorce was

reversed as to denying

interest in and to defendant's retirement because the Decree of
silent as to

retirement, the

issue had not previously been

determined in any prior adjudication, and the award of one-half of defendant's
retirement is reasonable and necessary.

The order as to the award of alimony

should be upheld because of the substantial change of circumstances which have
occurred since the Decree of Divorce, the financial needs of the plaintiff, the
financial ability of the defendant to provide the support for plaintiff, and
the need to keep the plaintiff from becoming a public charge.
WHEREFORE, the Respondent respectfully requests this court to uphoxi
the Order of the lower court wherein the alimony increase is awarded to the
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plaintiff but

reverse the Order of the

lower court denying plaintiff an

interest in and to defendant's retirement.
DATED this ^

dav of

r;^gU*«/>w "/• 1988.
LLY SOEMITTED:

NOLAN J. OLS]
Attorney fori
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